Discover the Leeuwin-2: Ratings & Maritime News

A recent investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) has determined that a lack of effective coordination and monitoring among the crew and harbour pilots aboard the 'Maersk Shekou' played a crucial role in the vessel's allision with the tall ship 'Leeuwin II' on August 30, 2024, in Fremantle’s port. During the incident, the container ship was navigating the port under the guidance of two harbour pilots amid heavy squall conditions before dawn. The ATSB's final report revealed that critical audio from the vessel's data recorder indicated that the primary pilot failed to communicate a necessary 10° helm order to the helmsman for the ship to correctly turn into the inner harbour—a misstep that went unnoticed by the rest of the bridge crew. Consequently, while the pilot attempted to maneuver the ship using the main engine and four assisting tugs, the helmsman mistakenly adhered to a previous course heading of 083°, leading to a collision with the moored 'Leeuwin II' at Victoria Quay. This resulted in a minor hull breach for the 'Maersk Shekou' and the unfortunate impact of its containers against the roof of the Western Australia Maritime Museum. Thankfully, the crew aboard both vessels emerged uninjured. The ATSB's findings underscored a significant failure in bridge resource management on the part of the bridge team, which included the two pilots and the ship’s crew. The lack of a cohesive understanding regarding necessary actions during the navigation led to inadequate monitoring and challenge of the vessel’s trajectory. Additionally, the investigation noted that the secondary pilot's attention wavered due to engagement in a non-essential mobile phone conversation at a critical time as the ship was navigating the entrance channel. Delays were also identified in securing the tugs, resulting in the bridge team, including the pilot, focusing on the final tug as the vessel approached its turning point into the inner harbour. In an inspiring turn of events, just over a year after sustaining significant damage, the 'Leeuwin II' has been restored through a remarkable community effort. The ship is now ready to set sail again, with its return celebrated during a homecoming event held on October 24, 2025, at Victoria Quay.

The renowned tall ship 'Leeuwin II' has commenced critical repairs following a tumultuous encounter with the container vessel 'Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle Port during a storm nine months ago. Fortunately, initial assessments revealed that the diesel engine and steering gear remained operational, affirming the vessel's seaworthiness. On May 19, 2025, the ship made its way from the B Shed quayside, assisted by a tug, to the Australian Marine Complex in Henderson for a much-anticipated dry docking. While the hull sustained minimal damage, the area where the mast is mounted is under careful scrutiny during the dry dock inspection. To facilitate a comprehensive repair and refit, 3000 lineal metres of Douglas Fir have been sourced from Canada, alongside multiple kilometres of specialized wiring and rope collected from various parts of Australia. The team aims to have the 'Leeuwin II' ready to sail just in time for the summer season. Discussions with insurers are nearing completion, although the total cost of the damages is still under evaluation. The tall ship is projected to return to operational status by December, offering an exciting prospect for marine enthusiasts. For further updates and photos, visit: https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/fremantle/sts-leeuwin-ii-iconic-tall-ship-smashed-in-container-ship-catastrophe-leaves-fremantle-to-begin-repairs-c-18740833.

An interim fact-finding report regarding the allision of the 'Maersk Shekou' with the tall ship 'Leeuwin II' at Fremantle on August 22, 2024, was published on April 17, 2025, shedding light on the incident's complexities. Key observations from the report highlight a misalignment in objectives between the vessel's helmsman and the pilots. The helmsman focused on adhering to a helm order of 083 degrees, while the pilots were engaged in maneuvering the vessel to make an emergency port turn using full ahead thrust, bow thrusters, assist tugs, and the port anchor, unaware that the helmsman was applying starboard rudder to counteract their actions. On that fateful morning, the 'Maersk Shekou' was navigating into Fremantle's harbor when it picked up two pilots. The primary pilot experienced fatigue, leading to the backup pilot taking command during the master/pilot exchange. Around 06:10 a.m., strong southwesterly winds intensified to approximately 40 knots, causing the ship to veer to starboard. Upon receiving the helm order to steer 083, the helmsman acknowledged but was already applying hard port rudder to counteract the wind's force, resulting in a slight error towards a heading of 087 degrees. As the situation evolved, the master recommended moving to full ahead to bolster steering power, a suggestion that was endorsed by the pilot. However, their efforts to turn the vessel quickly were met with challenges as the ship swung back toward the pier. Despite attempts to adjust the heading, the helmsman maintained consistent control on 083 degrees, directly towards 'Leeuwin II', which was positioned alarmingly close. At 06:15:54 a.m., a series of emergency measures were initiated, including the activation of bow thrusters to port and an order to stop engines. As the 'Maersk Shekou' began to reverse and slow, the emergency protocol was not sufficient to prevent a tragic allision. At approximately 06:18 a.m., the 'Maersk Shekou' collided with the 'Leeuwin II', impacting at a speed of three knots before coming to a full stop by 06:18:30 a.m. While attempting to cease lateral movement, the ship's bow thrusters continued to operate, leading to further challenges in the confined harbor space. The aftermath included damage to a stack of containers aboard 'Maersk Shekou', which struck the Western Australia Maritime Museum, alongside hull breaches above the waterline. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is continuing its investigation and will issue a comprehensive report with final conclusions upon completion of its review. For further details, the full interim report is available at the ATSB website.