Leeuwin-2

Ineffective coordination and monitoring by the crew and harbour pilots on board the 'Maersk Shekou' contributed to its allision with the tall ship 'Leeuwin II' on Aug 30, 2024, in the port of Fremantle, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau has found in its final investigation report. The container sihip was being navigated into the port under the direction of two harbour pilots in heavy squall conditions before dawn on that day, The audio from the ship’s bridge, taken from the vessel data recorder, found the primary pilot did not provide the helmsman with a planned port 10° helm order to turn into the inner harbour, which went undetected by the rest of the bridge team. This meant that as the pilot attempted to use the main engine and four assistance tugs to turn the ship, the helmsman attempted to maintain the ship on the previously instructed heading of 083°, rigorously opposing the ship’s planned turn. As a result, the 'Maersk Shekou' continued towards the Victoria Quay and hit the 'Leeuwin II', which was berthed at the quay, before the stern contacted the wharf edge, and containers on deck struck the roof of the WA Maritime Museum. The container ship sustained minor damage, including a hull breach, while its crew and the pilots were uninjured. The ATSB found the ship’s bridge team – comprising the two pilots and the ship’s crew – ineffectively implemented bridge resource management practices. There was not a shared mental model of the actions needed during the passage across members of the bridge team, and they failed to adequately monitor, or challenge, the ship’s turn and position in the channel. The ATSB’s investigation also found the secondary pilot was distracted from their monitoring responsibilities as they were engaged in a non-essential mobile phone call as the ship was transiting a critical area in the entrance channel. The investigation also identified that making fast the supporting tugs was delayed, resulting in the bridge team, including the pilot, being engaged with the final tug’s attachment just as the ship approached the wheel over point for the inner harbour entrance channel. Just over a year after being nearly destroyed, the 'Leeuwin II' is ready to sail again. A huge community effort has restored the ship, and its eturn was celebrated on Oct 24, 2025, with a homecoming party at Victoria Quay.

The 'Leeuwin II' is finally being repaired after being smashed by the container vessel 'Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle Port during a storm nine months ago. The diesel engine and steering gear were functional, and that the ship was seaworthy. On May 19, 2025, the ship was escorted by a tug from its B Shed quayside home to the Australian Marine Complex at Henderson, where the 3vessel was drydocked to be repaired and refitted. The hull was in pretty good shape, but the point where the mast was attached would be a critical focal point when she’s inspected in the dry dock. 3000 lineal metres of Douglas Fir have been ordered from Canada and kilometres of wires and rope from around Australia, with the goal is to have the ship back in the water for the start of the summer sailing season. The discussions with insurers were in the final stages and the total price of the damage was yet to be determined. The 'Leeuwin II' is expected to return to the water in December. Report with photos: https://www.perthnow.com.au/news/fremantle/sts-leeuwin-ii-iconic-tall-ship-smashed-in-container-ship-catastrophe-leaves-fremantle-to-begin-repairs-c-18740833

An interim factfinding report on the allision of the' Maersk Shekou' at Fremantle on Aug 22, 2024, which was published on April 17, 2025, suggested that the vessel's helmsman and pilots were operating with different goals. The helmsman was actively steering to maintain a heading of 083 degrees, his last received helm order. Meanwhile, the pilots were trying to make an emergency turn to port, using full ahead thrust, assist tugs, bow thrusters and the port anchor, They unaware that their helmsman was applying starboard rudder to counteract them. Early on Aug 22, the 'Maersk ShekouÄ began heading inbound into Fremantle's harbour and took aboard two pilots. The primary pilot assigned for the transit was fatigued, so the backup pilot took charge during the master/pilot exchange. At about 06.10 a.m., as they entered the narrow entrance channel for the inner port, southwesterly winds picked up to about 40 knots on the starboard quarter. The ship began to swing to starboard. The pilot ordered the helmsman to steer 083; the helmsman correctly acknowledged the order at about 0613:45 a.m. This was the heading that the helmsman would try to maintain throughout the final minutes of the casualty sequence. At the time that the order was given, the helmsman had the rudder hard to port to counteract the effects of the strengthening wind. It wasn't enough to do the job, and the 'Maersk Shekou's heading was about four degrees off to starboard (087). The master suggested going to full ahead to increase steering forces, and at about 0614:34 a.m. the pilot agreed. There was a pier ahead, and they needed to turn to port fast in order to enter the harbor. With more power and a series of assist tug movements, the 'Maersk Shekou' began to swing back to port. As it swung back from 087 through 086, the helmsman moved to check the swing: he brought the helm to midships, then briefly to 33 degrees starboard. The vessel steadied up squarely on 083, the last ordered heading he had received, which was straight towards the pier. The pilot was unsure why the vessel had stopped swinging to port, and at 615:33 a.m. he told the secondary pilot that something was wrong. The secondary pilot had been on a phone conversation at the back of the bridge and had not been involved in the back-and-forth among the bridge team, but he interrupted the call and joined the decisionmaking process. Together, without checking in with the helmsman, they began working the assist tugs to try to turn Maersk Shekou to port. The rudder was amidships at this point, and the helmsman was maintaining a steady heading of 083.5 towards the moored tall ship 'Leeuwin II', now less than a ship length away, with the boxship full ahead and making seven knots. At 0615:54 a.m., the master put the bow thrusters full to port. At 0616:10 a.m., the secondary pilot ordered stop engines, then full astern, and the master ordered the crew to prepare to drop the port anchor. Beginning at 0616:21 a.m., as these emergency measures to turn to port were under way, the helmsman applied more starboard rudder to try to counteract the effort to turn to port. The rudder would be over to starboard as much as 29 degrees over the course of the next minute. At 0616:49 a.m., the engines reached full astern and the 'Maersk Shekou' began to slow. The anchor, tugs and bow thruster managed to start a swing to port, but not fast enough to avert an allision. At about 0618 a.m., the 'Maersk Shekou' hit the 'Leeuwin II' at about three knots. The 'Maersk Shekou' came to a full stop by about 0618:30 a.m., but continued to spin in place. The bow thrusters were still on full to port, and the ship was swinging to port at about 13 degrees per minute. At 0619:52 a.m., the master noted to the pilots that the bow thrusters were still running with full power to port, and the thrusters were shut down,but not quickly enough to prevent contact in the narrow confines of the harbour. 40 seconds later, a stack of containers on the 'Maersk Shekou's starboard quarter hit the roof of the Western Australia Maritime Museum. The ship's hull scraped along the wharf for a short distance, damaging the quayside and breaching a small section of the hull plating above the waterline. The ATSB continues its investigation and will release its full report, including its formal conclusions, when it has completed its review. Interim report: https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/MO-2024-001%20Interim%20report.pdf