Polar-Prince

The National Transportation Safety Board has released its investigation report into the implosion of the submersible 'Titan' on June 18, 2023,, concluding that OceanGate’s inadequate engineering process and flawed analysis of monitoring data directly caused the catastrophic failure that killed all five persons aboard during a dive to the 'Titanic'. The submersible imploded at approximately 10:47 a.m. LT, while descending from the 'Polar Prince' to the wreckage, located about 372 miles southeast of St. John’s, at a depth of 3,880 meters. The implosion resulted in the immediate death of all occupants, including OceanGate’s CEO Stockton Rush, who were exposed to approximately 4,930 pounds per square inch of water pressure. The vessel was a total loss, valued at approximately $4.2 million. The NTSB found that the 'Titan'’s pressure vessel likely suffered damage after it surfaced at the end of dive 80 in the form of one or more delaminations that weakened the pressure vessel. After dive 82, the submersible sustained additional damage of unknown origin that further deteriorated the pressure vessel’s condition. OceanGate’s analysis of the 'Titan' pressure vessel real-time monitoring data was flawed, meaning that the company was unaware that the submersible was damaged and needed to be immediately removed from service after dive 80. The existing delaminations and additional damage that deteriorated the condition of the pressure vessel between dive 82 and the casualty dive resulted in a local buckling failure that led to the implosion. The NTSB determined that OceanGate’s engineering process for the 'Titan' was inadequate and resulted in the construction of a carbon fiber composite pressure vessel that contained multiple anomalies and failed to meet necessary strength and durability requirements. Because OceanGate did not adequately test the Titan, the company was unaware of the pressure vessel’s actual strength and durability, which was likely much lower than their target. The 22-foot-long submersible’s pressure vessel was constructed in 2020 and consisted of a thick-walled, carbon fiber-based composite cylinder fitted at each end with a titanium ring that was capped with a titanium dome. The titanium segments were glued to the cylinder, and the titanium domes were bolted to the segments. Had OceanGate followed Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular 05-93 guidance for emergency response plans, they likely would have had emergency response assets standing by, and the 'Titan' likely would have been found sooner, saving time and resources even though a rescue was not possible in this case. Despite OceanGate’s failure to notify search and rescue assets about its planned expedition, as well as the limited resources able to operate at the depth of the 'Titanic', the US Coast Guard’s SAR coordination efforts were effective and resulted in the timely discovery of the wreckage. Voluntary guidance and current US small passenger vessel regulations were not sufficiently tailored to current pressure vessel for human occupancy operations to ensure safety in accordance with established technical and classification society standards. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the hull failure and implosion was “OceanGate’s inadequate engineering process, which failed to establish the actual strength and durability of the Titan pressure vessel and resulted in the company operating a carbon fiber composite vessel that sustained delamination damage that was subsequently exacerbated by additional damage of unknown origin, resulting in a damaged internal structure that subsequently led to a local buckling failure of the pressure vessel.” Contributing factors included US and international voluntary guidance and US small passenger vessel regulations that were insufficient to ensure OceanGate adhered to established industry standards, as well as OceanGate’s flawed analysis of their pressure vessel monitoring system data. As a result of the investigation, the NTSB recommended that the US Coast Guard commission a panel of experts to study current pressure vessel for human occupancy operations and disseminate findings to industry. The board also recommended implementing US regulations for these vessels informed by the study findings and consistent with international requirements and guidance. Additional recommendations included updating NVIC 05-93 to include the revised definition of small passenger vessel as reflected in the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993, and proposing that the International Maritime Organization make MSC.1/Circ. 981 mandatory to promote consistent application of pressure vessel for human occupancy rules among member states. The NTSB report followed the US Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation’s comprehensive 300-page Report of Investigation released in August, which described the loss of the 'Titan' as “preventable” and resulting from multiple systemic failures at OceanGate. The Coast Guard investigation determined that the primary cause was the loss of structural integrity of the carbon fiber hull, with the probable failure point being either the adhesive joint between the forward dome and titanium segment, or the carbon fiber hull near the forward end of the submersible. According to the Coast Guard report, OceanGate strategically exploited regulatory gaps and confusion to operate the Titan completely outside established deep-sea protocols. The report states: “For several years preceding the incident, OceanGate leveraged intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the company’s favorable reputation to evade regulatory scrutiny.” The Coast Guard investigation also highlighted OceanGate’s toxic workplace environment which used firings of senior staff members and the looming threat of being fired to dissuade employees and contractors from expressing safety concerns. Full report: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA23FM036.aspx

The U.S. Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation (MBI) has released its Report of Investigation (ROI) on Aug 5 on the loss of the submersible 'Titan', which imploded during a June 2023 dive to the wreck of the 'Titanic', killing five people, after having been deployed from the 'Polar Prince' on June 18, 2023. The more than 300-page ROI outlines key findings and contributing factors in the casualty and includes 17 safety recommendations aimed at strengthening oversight of submersible operations, improving coordination among federal agencies and closing gaps in international maritime policy. The two-year investigation has identified multiple contributing factors that led to this tragedy, providing valuable lessons learned to prevent a future occurrence. There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework. The board determined the primary contributing factors were OceanGate’s inadequate design, certification, maintenance and inspection process for the Titan. Other factors cited in the report include a toxic workplace culture at OceanGate, an inadequate domestic and international regulatory framework for submersible operations and vessels of novel design, and an ineffective whistleblower process under the Seaman’s Protection Act. The board also found OceanGate failed to properly investigate and address known hull anomalies following its 2022 Titanic expedition. Investigators determined the Titan’s real-time monitoring system generated data that should have been analyzed and acted on during the 2022 'Titanic' expedition. However, OceanGate did not take any action related to the data, conduct any preventative maintenance or properly store the Titan during the extended off season before its 2023 'Titanic' expedition. The MBI recommendations included restricting the Oceanographic Research Vessel designations for submersibles, expanding federal and international requirements to all submersibles conducting scientific or commercial dives and requiring Coast Guard documentation for all U.S. submersibles. The board also recommended adding Coast Guard personnel capacity at Coast Guard Headquarters to support new construction oversight and field inspections involving submersibles and vessels of novel design. Further recommendations included requiring operators to submit dive and emergency response plans to the local Coast Guard officer in charge, marine inspection; evaluating the Coast Guard’s subsea search and rescue capabilities; and working with the International Maritime Organization to define passenger submersibles and expand international safety requirements for submersibles operating on the high seas. The board also called for a new Occupational Safety and Health Administration and Coast Guard agreement to clarify whistleblower investigative protocols and improve interagency coordination. The Marine Board's report is now under review by the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Upon completion of the review, the Commandant will issue a Final Action Memorandum confirming the U.S. Coast Guard's position on the recommendations and any actions to be pursued. Report with link to ROI: https://www.news.uscg.mil/Press-Releases/Article/4265651/coast-guard-marine-board-of-investigation-releases-report-on-titan-submersible/

Footage released by the US Coast Guard has captured the sound of the submersible 'Titan' imploding during its last journey to the wreck of the 'Titanic' in June 2023. Wendy Rush, the wife of OceanGate's chief executive Stockton Rush, asked "what was that bang?" as she unknowingly heard the moment the 'Titan' cracked. The USCG believes the noise - which sounded like a door slamming - was the sound of the implosion reaching the surface of the ocean.. The footage released by the US Coast Guard (USCG) shows her, attempting to contact those on board the vessel during its final descent wiith operator and OceanGate founder Mr Rush, British adventurer Hamish Harding, French deep sea explorer Paul-Henri Nargeolet, and Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son Suleman on board. In the footage, OceanGate director Mrs Rush and colleague Gary Foss can be seen, tracking the 'Titan's descent, from the 'Polar Prince'. Moments later, Mrs Rush receives a message from the sub saying it had dropped two weights. The team assumed the 'Titan' was continuing its descent, but investigators would later believe the delayed message was sent prior to the sub failing. The footage has been presented as evidence to the USCG Marine Board of Investigation as part of its probe into the incident. A final report will be released following its completion. OceanGate suspended all exploration and commercial operations in July 2023. Report with video: https://news.sky.com/story/ship-footage-captures-sound-of-titan-submersible-imploding-13373147

The U.S. Coast Guard reported that the crew aboard the 'Polar Prince', supporting the 'Titan', felt a shudder when the submersible imploded deep underwater. The five passengers aboard the sub were killed instantly: Stockton Rush, the co-founder and CEO of the sub's maker, OceanGate, French explorer Paul Henri Nargeolet, British businessman Hamish Harding, Pakistani businessman Shahzada Dawood and his 19-year-old son, Suleman. The statement was provided to the board, when the master was asked if he or crew members heard anything indicating the OceanGate submersible imploded: "The answer from the master was, 'With the benefit of hindsight, I now believe I felt the Polar Prince shudder at around the time communications were reportedly lost, but at the time, we thought nothing of it. It was slight,'" A former OceanGate employee testified during the hearing on Sep 28 that he resigned from the submersible company after Rush told him he would "buy a congressman" to make problems with its 'Titan' go away. Matthew McCoy was an active duty member of the U.S. Coast Guard prior to joining OceanGate as an operations technician in April 2017 as the company was building the first prototype, which was never used on Titanic dives. He said he quit six months later, in September 2017, a day after his conversation with Rush.

The submersible 'Titan' had malfunctioned days before its final voyage, the scientific director of the company that owned the craft said during a US Coast Guard investigation. Other testimonies indicated a lack of safety checks before the unconventionally designed craft set sail. Steve Ross, the scientific director for the company that owned the submersible testified on Sep 19 that the sub had malfunctioned just prior to the fatal dive. Appearing before a U.S. Coast Guard panel, He told the board about a platform issue the experimental submersible experienced in June 2023, just days before it imploded on its way to the 'Titanic'. The malfunction caused passengers onboard the submersible to tumble about, and it took an hour to get them out of the water. The submersible pilot, OceanGate co-founder Stockton Rush, crashed into bulkheading during the malfunction, Ross said. One passenger was hanging upside down. The other two managed to wedge themselves into the bow end cap. Ross did not know if a safety assessment of the 'Titan' or an inspection of its hull was performed after the incident. An investigatory panel has listened to three days of testimony that raised questions about the company's operations before the doomed mission. Rush was among five people who died when the submersible imploded en route to the site of the 'Titanic' in June 2023. Earlier on Sep 19, Renata Rojas, a mission specialist for the company, told the Coast Guard that the firm was staffed by competent people who wanted to “make dreams come true." Rojas is a member of the Explorers Club, which lost members Hamish Harding and Paul-Henri Nargeolet in the implosion. “I knew what I was doing was very risky. I never at any point felt unsafe by the operation,” Rojas said during the public hearing that is part of a high-level investigation into the cause of the implosion. The public hearing began on Sep 16. Some of the testimony focused on problems the company had prior to the fatal 2023 dive. During the hearing, former OceanGate operations director David Lochridge said on Sep 17 that he frequently clashed with Rush and felt the company was committed only to making money. The hearing ran to run through Sep 20 with more witnesses still to come and resumes this week. Lochridge and other witnesses have painted a picture of a company led by people who were impatient to get the unconventionally designed craft into the water. The deadly accident set off a worldwide debate about the future of private undersea exploration.Coast Guard officials noted at the start of the hearing that the submersible had not been independently reviewed, as is standard practice. That and the 'Titan'’s unusual design subjected it to scrutiny in the undersea exploration community. OceanGate suspended its operations after the implosion. The company has no full-time employees currently, but has been represented by an attorney during the hearing. During the submersible’s final dive on June 18, 2023, the crew lost contact after an exchange of texts about the 'Titan'’s depth and weight as it descended. The 'Polar Prince' then sent repeated messages asking if the 'Titan' could still see the ship on its onboard display. One of the last messages from the 'Titan'’s crew to the 'Polar Prince' before the submersible imploded stated, “all good here.”