Grande-Costa-Davori

The Coast Guard’s Office of Investigations and Casualty Analysis has released a Report of Investigation (ROI) regarding the fire on the 'Grande Costa d'Avorio' and subsequent fatalities of two Newark Fire Department firefighters. The vessel was conducting cargo operations at Berth 18, Port Newark, New Jersey on July 5, 2023, at the time of the fire. The ROI can be found on the following website: https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Prevention-Policy-CG-5P/Inspections-Compliance-CG-5PC-/Office-of-Investigations-Casualty-Analysis/Marine-Casualty-Reports/ The fire was reported to have started late in the evening of July 5, 2023, and continued for five days. As a result, the Coast Guard Northeast District Commander initiated a District Formal Investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Coast Guard issued five safety and six administrative recommendations, five findings of concern (Findings of Concern 015-25 through 019-25), and one safety alert. A Commandant’s Final Action Memorandum (FAM) detailing the Coast Guard response and actions on each recommendation has beem included in the ROI. The ROI and FAM can be found at: U.S. Coast Guard Report of Investigation: Fire and Subsequent Loss of Two Land-Based Firefighter Lives Aboard the Italian Flagged Roll-on Roll-off/Container Vessel GRANDE COSTA D'AVORIO (IMO 9465382) While Conducting Cargo Operations at Berth 18, Port Newark, New Jersey on July 5, 2023

In the hearing on April 15, the National Transportation Safety Board approved final conclusions from the investigation of the fire aboard the 'Grande Costa D'Avorio' in the port of Newark in 2023. The investigators confirmed that the fire started when the Jeep Wrangler that longshoremen used as a pusher vehicle overheated and burned inside the cargo bay, setting nearby vehicles on fire. The 'Grande Costa D'Avorio' carried used cars from the U.S. to Africa, including forklifts that were so damaged that they could not roll, and "non-runner" vehicles that have to be pushed aboard. The Terminal operator Ports America's local unit in Newark was in the practice of using ordinary passenger vehicles as pusher trucks to shove non-running but still-rolling cars up the loading ramp and up the interior ramps inside the vessel. The Jeep Wrangler was in use in an industrial application for which it was not intended. This particular vehicle model was subject to a recall notice because its transmission had a tendency to overheat under extreme offroad use. Overheating would cause the transmission fluid to boil out of the housing and contact hot engine parts or exhaust piping, where it would catch fire. To address this known problem, the recall required installing an audible hot oil alarm and a warning light on the dashboard; the Jeep had had this service done - but the alarm was just a warning, not a shutoff. On the day of the fire, the 'Grande Costa D'Avorio' was loading 920 used cars for export, including nonrunners. At about 0 p.m., a longshoreman was driving the Wrangler on his 38th push run of the day up the nterior ramps, a far heavier task than the offroading conditions addressed by Jeep's recall. He was shoving a nonrunner ahead when he heard a clunk, and he saw fireballs dripping from underneath the vehicle. Based on the recall notice, the evidence from the scene and the extreme duty cycle imposed on the Jeep, The NTSB concluded that the casualty was caused by the decision to use a vehicle that wasn't designed for the application, resulting in its transmission oil boiling over and catching fire on hot engine parts. The Jeep operator was not able to get the fire out with an extinguisher, and the ship's fire alarm system went off, alerting the crew. 22 minutes after the fire was discovered, the master ordered the space sealed off and the fixed CO2 firefighting system discharged. However, the crew could not close the Deck 12 garage door because there was no external control to operate it. In order to close it, one crew member would have had to stand inside the burning space, hold an actuator button down to shut themselves in with the smoke and fire, then make their way 120 feet aft to a ladder well on the port side - between tightly parked cars. The lack of a button on the ramp side of the door was a SOLAS violation, according to NTSB, but the class society told the agency that it was acceptable because the door stays closed while at sea and does not need to be operated under way - only in port. The captain agreed that closing the door with crew members on the fire side would be unsafe, so the garage door stayed open. The CO2 system was discharged anyways with the door still fully open; an ATF study performed after the fact found that if the crew had had a practical way to close the door, the CO2 would have put out the fire. When the firefighters arrived on scene, the incident commander ordered a squad into the space to attack the fire. The local fire department's decision to open and close other compartment boundaries for moving personnel in and out further reduced the CO2 concentration and the fixed firefighting system's effectiveness, the NTSB concluded, ultimately increasing the severity of the fire. The NTSB noted that this decision was contrary to normal marine firefighting practice. Two firefighters went missing in the space and a SAR effort began. The compartment's ventilation system was turned on to clear smoke, removing the rest of the CO2 and introducing fresh oxygen. The two missing men lost their lives inside the space, and the fire burned for days. The NTSB believed that the two firefighters were exposed to an unnecessary risk when they were ordered into the CO2 flooding zone without being informed that it had been activated. The incident commander did not communicate the fact that the CO2 system had been discharged to the personnel entering the ship; at one point, a fire battalion chief even climbed a ladder well and opened a hatch to look in, despite the risk of asphyxiation on the other side. The NTSB found that most of the local first responders had not recently taken marine firefighting classes, and they were not familiar with the vessel's fire control plan or with CO2 flooding systems. The lack of marine vessel firefighting training left the land based firefighters unprepared to respond to a vessel fire, resulting in an ineffective response that contributed to the fire's spread, vessel damage and led to the firefighters' casualties. The NTSB believed that local Newark firefighters should never have entered the space to fight the fire. The best method to extinguish that fire was to work with the crew to close the Deck 12 door and allow the CO2 to function. The NTSB has issued a recommendation to AAPA to inform all port authorities of the risks of the dangerous misuse of passenger trucks as pusher vehicles. It also asked seaports to help out their local fire departments to increase awareness, adopt basic vessel familiarization and firefighter training among first responders. The NTSB also recommended that the 'Grande Costa D'Avorio''s class society should change its guidelines to require SOLAS fire doors to be closeable from both sides.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will convene a public board meeting on April 15 to determine what caused the fire aboard the 'Grande Costa D’Avorio' that claimed the lives of two firefighters in Newark, New Jersey. on July 5, 2023. It had started when a pusher vehicle operated by shoreside workers caught fire while loading cars on an interior garage deck. The situation turned tragic when two land-based firefighters became disoriented in the smoke-filled decks and died. Six additional emergency responders sustained injuries during the response operations. The local fire department responding to the incident had little to no maritime firefighting training, experience, or familiarization with cargo ships of any type, according to preliminary findings from the ongoing Coast Guard investigation.

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will convene a public board meeting on April 15, 2025, to determine what caused the fire aboard the 'Grande Costa D’Avorio', that claimed the lives of two firefighters in Newark, New Jersey on July 5, 2023. It had started when a pusher vehicle, which was operated by shoreside workers, caught fire while loading cars on an interior garage deck. At the time of the incident, the vessel, operated by Grimaldi Group, was carrying approximately 1,200 vehicles and 157 containers. The operator confirmed there were no electric vehicles or hazardous cargo aboard. Two firefighters became disoriented in the smoke-filled decks and died. Six additional emergency responders sustained injuries during the response operations. “The local fire department responding to the incident had little to no maritime firefighting training, experience, or familiarization with cargo ships of any type,” according to preliminary findings from the ongoing Coast Guard investigation. The U.S. Coast Guard, conducting a parallel investigation, has already held public hearings examining the vessel’s condition, cargo loading procedures, and the initial response by both ship’s crew and local firefighters. In response to the incident, the Coast Guard issued Marine Safety Alert 09-23 in Nov 2023, calling for improved coordination of marine firefighting preparation efforts nationwide:. “Vessel fires require more firefighting resources and different technical skills than many land-based firefighting agencies traditionally possess,” the Coast Guard investigators noted. The situation is further complicated by language barriers between international crews and local first responders, particularly during high-stress emergencies. During the upcoming meeting, the NTSB board will vote on findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations, potentially leading to changes in the draft final report. Both the Coast Guard and NTSB will issue separate investigation reports aimed at enhancing maritime and first-responder safety to prevent similar incidents.